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TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
 
Since antiquity, the rule of law has been juxtaposed to the rule of men. The ideal of isonomìa, of the 
equality of all citizens before the law, was promoted by the reform of Athens’s constitution by 
Clisthenes, which represented the democratic turn of Athens’s politics. The rule by men could grant 
neither impartiality nor stable expectations of government’s actions, let alone equality of treatment: 
the rule of men depended on the character, the inclinations, the virtues and the vices of rulers 
engendering unpredictability in the life of the polis and discretionary power about which citizens had 
no control. Both Plato and Aristotle set apart the rule of law from the rule of men, arguing that only 
the former could provide a just and stable polis. The generality of law is a guarantee of impartiality, 
predictability and equal treatment of all citizens by the political institutions; by the same token, state 
coercive power is thus limited. 
Such ancient ideal became part of the liberal outlook from the beginning of modernity as the 
alternative to the absolute power of the sovereign. Historians of political thought trace the 
development of the rule of law to processes taking place in England from the Magna Charta 
Libertatum (1215) to the Habeas Corpus (1679) up to the Bill of Rights (1689) which marked limits 
to the sovereign power towards its subjects. And typically the limits to the power of the king was 
entrusted to the law, either to a written Constitution, in the continental tradition, or to the common 
law and material constitution in the English tradition. In either case, the leading idea was that the law 
should represent the barrier to the discretionary power of the ruler, to despotism and to the unfairness  
of being subjugated to the will of the ruler, to his/her whims and favoritism. The development of 
doctrine of the rule of law was complex and followed different paths in different contexts. In England, 
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689) argued for the state’s limits in front of individual’s 
rights; in France Montesquieu in his Esprit des Lois (1748) advanced the idea of a written constitution 
with a clear separation of institutional powers as the proper implementation of the rule of law ideal. 
In the United States, the Federalist papers precisely expressed the view that the Constitution, as a 
barrier against despotic government, should be supplemented by Federal courts, independent from 
government, as the impartial interpreters of the Constitution in defense of citizen’s rights. In 
Germany, following from the Kantian legal doctrine, the ideal was developed in the doctrine of 
Rechtsstaat, that is a state constrained by constitutional law, against any arbitrariness of power.  
 However, I do not intend to reconstruct the history of the doctrine and of the practice of the 
rule of law, but, rather, to focus on two possible interpretations of the ideal which have marked two 
different legal and political traditions. In general, as we have seen,  the ideal of the rule of law aims 
at limiting the state power over its citizens, by circumscribing the legitimate sphere of government’s 
action within constitutional boundaries and by declaring that the government itself is bound to the 
law and accountable if it infringes it. The separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary 
grant that both citizens and rulers are equally subject to the law. In turn, the limitation of government 
by the constitution implies the legal equality of all citizens, on the one hand, and the predictability of 
the legal system, on the other.  Both justice and stability are thus served by the ideal of the rule of 
law.  The two values can however be stressed differently, and in case one at the expenses of the other, 
in the two alternative interpretations of the rule of law I have been referring above.  The first 
interpretation is typically embodied in classical liberalism, especially in the Anglo-American 
tradition, but also in French constitutionalism, and emphasizes the defense of individual liberty rights 
against state’s power. The second interpretation, represented by the German tradition of the 
Rechtsstaat, instead stresses the predictability of the system and the consequent effect of producing 
orderly and stable expectations in society. The first interpretation privileges the citizens’ perspective   
aiming primarily to the defense of their rights against any abuse of governmental power. The second 
interpretation instead, assumes the standpoint of the state and of its orderly organization and 
predictability against arbitrariness and disorder. I am not saying that the first perspective excludes the 
second, and viceversa, I am just saying that the stress is decidedly different in the two interpretations. 
These two understandings of the rule of law can be exemplified, respectively, in the analysis 
of Friedrich Hayek, in his The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and of Max Weber’s description of the 
formal-legal type of power in Economy and Society (1922). Hayek reconstructs the origin of the rule 
of law in the seventeenth century England, under the influence of the Greek ideal of isonomia and of 
Cicero, and points out the following requirements: 1) the rule of law should rely on abstract rules, as 
opposed to instructions.  2) It should provide certainty. 3) It should grant equality in virtue of the 
generality of laws. In this way: “Because the rule of law means that government must never coerce 
an individual except in the enforcement of a known rule, it constitutes a limitation on the powers of 
all governments, including the power of the legislature” (205).  In Hayek’s view, the rule of law is 
first and foremost a limitation of state coercion vis-à-vis citizens, a limitation exercised by laws that 
must be placed in the context of his general vision of social evolution. In this respect, Hayek marks 
his distance from the formal version of constitutionalism embodied in legal positivism: he thinks that 
all laws should conform to certain substantive principles which are embodied in the legal tradition 
and which represent the source of constitutional rules, whether written in a formal Constitution, like 
the American one, or implicit in the substantive constitution like in the English case. In any case, 
constitutional rules provide the framework within which individual liberty can express itself, in the 
double sense that individual action is freed from arbitrary coercive state power, and that it can count 
on stable expectations to pursue its goals. Instead, Max Weber’s presentation of the ideal type of 
legal-rational power precisely reconstruct the Rechtsstaat, and assumes the standpoint of the state and 
of its characterizing features. Even discounting the specific sociological, and not normative, 
perspective aimed at distinguishing different kinds of political power, Weber presents this type of 
power as superior to the other two types (traditional and charismatic) because a) it is governed by 
impersonal formal rules, hence independent from personal relationships, b) it embodies knowledge 
and competence in its administration. In this sense, it is a better modality of exercising the power, 
because is more efficient, stable, predictable and impartial, given that it has done away with personal 
relationship1. It may be the case that a more stable and predictable state has also the side effect of 
allowing more individual liberty than any arbitrary power. Yet the protection of individual rights is 
not what the Rechtsstaat has been spelled out for.  
In the contemporary political philosophy, the rule of law, in the interpretation of Rechtsstaat, 
is definitely faded away, while in the liberal interpretation is actually embodied in the outlook of 
liberal democracy, as a necessary requisite. Moreover, there is an aspect of ideal of the rule of law 
which is still at the center of the debate.  As we have seen, the rule of law is meant to minimize state 
coercion and any abuse of state power. This aim is subscribed by the crucial concern for the 
justification of coercion present in contemporary studies on democratic legitimacy.  This issue 
represents in fact an enlargement of the ideal of the rule of law, since it does not refer simply to the 
extant legal framework for circumscribing the legitimate state action, but actually questions the legal 
framework itself by means of the democratic principle. The democratic principle affirms that state 
coercion is legitimate iff it is acceptable by anyone who is subject to it,  that is each citizen.  Some 
may see this justificatory endeavor as beyond and beside the boundary of the rule of law. I think 
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1 This type of power has its own drawbacks in the dependence of the rules from the competent bureaucracy, but this 
issue needs not concern us here.  
                                            
